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Judicial Protection of the Constitution
In Latin America
By DAvID S. CLARK*
A constitution, if it is to exist as a meaningful document for so-
ciety, needs a protector. The question of who is to be the protector,
however, has remained a controversial one throughout the history of
modem nations. Locke and Montesquieu tended to take for granted
that the people's representatives in an elected legislature would guard
the constitution. Later the notion spread, through Hamilton's famous
article in The Federalist Papers," that an independent high judicial au-
thority would be more reliable as a protector of the fundamental law
and the rights of the citizen. This idea was slow to gain ground in
Europe, and only became widespread after World War 1H.
However, in the nations of Latin America, frequently assumed to
have adopted of European legal systems, the idea of judicial review
was widely accepted in the nineteenth century.. Development of the
judiciary as the guardian of the constitution in Latin America has been
uneven. Unevenness, however, connotes successes as well as failures.
The former outnumber the latter today in Latin America. Out of a
total Latin American population of 286 million, a majority of people
live in countries with relatively effective judicial review.2 Recent stud-
ies suggest that several nations in Latin America have powerful judici-
aries that are substantially independent of the political branches of gov-
ernment.' To comprehend the social, political and economic environ-
* Assistant director, Studies in Law and Development, Stanford Law School; lec-
turer in law, University of Santa Clara Law School.
I owe particular appreciation to John Henry Merryman, Carlos Jos6 Guti6rrez, Ed-
mundo Fuenzalida Faivovich, Lawrence Friedman, and Lorenzo Zolezzi for many help-
ful comments on this article.
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
2. See text accompanying notes 119-20 infra.
3. See, e.g., T. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL PoLrrIcS 212-17, 226, 247 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as BECKER]; J. LAMBERT, LATN AMERICA: SoCIALo STRUCTuRE AND
POLITCAL INSTITUTIONS 272-76, 287-95 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LAMBERT]; and
Schwarz, Judges Under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United States and
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ment within which these legal institutions must function, it is instruc-
tive to consider briefly the background that led to the Latin American
adoption of the judiciary as the protector of the constitution. After
tracing the historical and ideological underpinnings for judicial review,
this article will attempt to measure the effectiveness of judicial review
in Latin American countries on a comparative basis. Finally, the re-
lationship between effective judicial review and the level of national
economic development and the type of political regime will be ex-
amined.
The Historical Background
At the time of the discovery of America, the political institutions
of the Iberian peninsula were in the process of becoming more central-
ized. The marriage of Isabella, queen of Castile, and Ferdinand, king
of Aragon, united these two kingdoms. Each, however, retained its
political and administrative identity, its own laws, and its peculiar judi-
cial institutions. 4 Since Isabella had provided the financial backing and
legal authorization for Columbus' 1492 voyage, the American colonies
were subjugated to the crown of Castile. Consequently, the laws and
institutions of Castile came to the New World, shaping decisively the
structure and character of early Spanish American institutions. As a
result of Columbus' voyage, however, uncertainties regarding rights to
the newly discovered land confronted both Spain and Portugal. Portu-
guese control of Brazil was the eventual consequence. 5
Mexico, 3 CAL. WEsT. INTL. L.J. 260 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Schwarz]; cf. P.
GONZALEZ, DEMOCRACY N Mnxco 21-24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GONZAIEZ].
4. The kingdom of Aragon had, for example, a justiciar or chief justice who
could annul acts of the king and also protect the liberty of the individual and his prop-
erty rights against the unlawful action of the king's officials. In Castile, on the other
hand, there was no justiciar or other judicial officer vested with equivalent prestige and
power. Eder, Judicial Review in Latin America, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 570, 570-71 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Eder I].
5. Portugal was unified before Spain. During much of the fifteenth century, the
Portuguese explored the west coast of Africa and searched for a new route to the Far
East. Columbus' voyage created certain problems concerning the newly discovered land.
If Columbus had reached Asia, for example, Portuguese prior claims would have to be
considered. If he had discovered new territory, then claims by Spain would have to be
legalized. The Spanish pope, Alexander VI, was asked by the sovereigns of both nations
to help settle the problem. As a result, the New World was divided between Spain and
Portugal in 1493 by three papal bulls. These provided for a north-south line in the At-
lantic running 100 leagues west of the Azores, with the territory east of the line belong-
ing to Portugal and the territory west of the line belonging to Spain. When this arrange-
ment caused Portugal to complain that she had not been given sufficient sea territory
to navigate around Africa, the two countries signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, moving
the line westward. Though not known at the time, this agreement gave Portugal a toe-
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The pattern of Iberian administration in the American colonies re-
flected the steady growth of centralized rule in Spain and Portugal. 6
The colonies, treated as direct and exclusive possessions of the king,
were separate kingdoms united with those of the Iberian peninsula, but
under a common sovereign.7 The Spanish king's power over his sub-
jects was, although ample, not unlimited. America was a vast and dis-
tant land. Communication was slow. Totalitarian control, even if de-
sired, was physically impossible. Furthermore Portugal, with her lim-
ited resources already committed to exploitation of Africa and the Far
East, had administrative difficulties in controlling Brazil.
Administration and law enforcement in a complex society require
the existence of courts or their functional equivalent to interpret and
apply laws and regulations.8 To meet this need, the Spanish and Por-
tuguese admini trators adapted the royal court system to a new environ-
ment. One of the most striking characteristics of colonial government
was its heavy reliance on judicial devices, procedures, and on legally
trained officials-what Professor Parry refers to as the "rapidly increas-
hold on the eastern bulge of South America. From this map manipulation developed
the colony of Brazil.
6. See S. SCHWARTZ, SOVEREIGNTY AND SocmT IN COLONIA. BRAZIL, at xii-xiv
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ScHwARTz] The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
brought among the monarchies of Europe a progressive strengthening of the kings' posi-
tion vis h vis the secular and clerical feudal limitations of the Middle Ages. In England
and France, as well as in Spain and Portugal, the sovereigns strove to win direct control
of their territory, free from feudal ties to local lords, by appointing their own officials.
The authority of the kings' officials gradually increased, especially in the administration
of justice. Castile, particularly by the end of the sixteenth century, began to approach
the status of an absolute monarchy. At the center was the sovereign, surrounded by
a small group of advisers. For financial, legislative and judicial problems, special bodies
of counsellors and magistrates were formed; they acted in the name of the king and were
constantly consulted by him. The king's court of justice, moreover, acquired increasing
influence.
Only in England had a constitutional balance between the monarchy and other
forces in society been reached and institutionalized by 1500. For example, the king was
bound by the Magna Carta to seek assent of the lords in crucial matters of taxation
and war. In 1295, representatives of the middle classes and landed commoners entered
Parliament, and in 1433, the approval of both houses of Parliament became necessary
for the passage of bills. As early as the thirteenth century, moreover, the more impor-
tant civil and commercial cases were already being heard in the king's courts. A class
of professional judges developed in these courts whose work was to be decisive in the
elaboration of a uniform law throughout the kingdom. See Dainow, The Civil Law and
the Common Law, 15 AM. J. CowP. L. 419, 421-23 (1967).
7. C. HARING, THm SP AIsH EMPE IN AMERICA 7 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
HARING].
8. See Schwartz & Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity, 70 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 159, 165-66 (1964).
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ing body of officials, lawyers, notaries and miscellaneous quill-drivers."
The interpretation of the various legal codes lay in the hands of a nu-
merous and powerful judiciary, at whose head stood the king. Spain
and Portugal carried over from the age of feudalism to the age of sov-
ereignty the notion of jurisdiction as the essential function of authority.
At least during the sixteenth century the king, though he legislated con-
tinually, was still regarded as the chief of judges.10 The principal task
of government, accordingly, was adjudicating between competing inter-
ests rather than deliberately planning and constructing a new society."
After several temporary groups of advisers, Charles V of Spain de-
cided in 1524 to create the Council of the Indies, modeled after the
Council of Castile, to act in matters related to the colonies. The coun-
cil's authority extended beyond judicial review, as the highest court of
appeal, to practically all fields of government action: legislative, finan-
cial, military and ecclesiastical.12 The principal royal agents in the col-
onies were the viceroys, the captains general, and the audiencias. Vi-
ceroys and captains general had the same duties. The former, how-
ever, were more important due to the larger expanse of territory as-
signed to their jurisdiction. Both viceroys and captains general were
the supreme civil and military officers within their regions.13 The ma-
jor restraint upon the arbitrary exercise of power by these officials,
however, lay in the royal audiencias,'4 nine of which were created in
the sixteenth century. 5 The audiencia was essentially a court of ap-
peals with jurisdiction over roughly the same territory governed by the
viceroy or captain general. It served, in addition, as a consultative
council to the executive officials and had a limited degree of legislative
power. 16
The audiencia system reflected two important characteristics of
Spanish imperial government in America: the division of authority and
responsibility, and the king's distrust of initiative on the part of his co-
lonial officials. Although these characteristics often prevented effec-
9. J. PARRY, THE SPANISH SEABORNE EMPIRE 173, 192 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as PARRY].
10. Id. at 193-94; see also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 4, 14.
11. PARRY, supra note 9, at 193-94.
12. W. PIERsON & F. GIL, GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA 37 (1957) [herein-
after cited as PIERSON & GIL].
13. HARING, supra note 7, at 119.
14. Id. at 129.
15. PIERSON & GIL, supra note 12, at 45 n.5.
16. HARING, supra note 7, at 77, 119; J. VANcn & H. CLAGETT, A GumE TO THE
LAW & LEGAL LITERATURE OF MEXIco 3 (1945) [hereinafter cited as VANcE & CLAGETr].
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tive administration in the colonies, they aided the king and his council
in maintaining political control in Spain. Spanish imperial government
was one of checks and balances, although not secured by the separa-
tion of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial branches seen in
modem constitutional regimes, but rather secured by a division of au-
thority among different individuals or tribunals exercising the same
powers.1
7
It is in the audiencia, as a result, that one can find the germina-
tion of what will be judicial review of legislative and executive acts in
Latin American nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.' s
It was the center, the core, of the administrative system, and the
principal curb upon oppression and illegality by the viceroys and
other governors. Viceroys came and went; the audiencia was a
more permanent and continuous body, which acquired a long
line of corporate tradition . . . . [Audiencias] embodied a "ten-
dency toward jurisdictional autonomy in spite of royal prag-
matics and the ill-concealed jealousies of viceroys and gover-
nors" . 19
As a court of law the audiencia maintained an unquestioned supremacy;
the technical right of appeal from its decisions to the king and Council
of the Indies, furthermore, was made so difficult as to be nearly im-
possible by the eighteenth century."0
The jurisdiction of the audiencia was extensive. All colonial
audiencias exercised a general supervision over the conduct of inferior
magistrates within their territory. They possessed, in addition to their
appellate powers over civil, criminal, administrative and some ecclesias-
tical matters, original jurisdiction in cases concerning royal patronage
and revenue, and might take the initiative in investigating any usurpa-
tion of royal authority, even to the point of sitting in judgment on the
acts of a viceroy. 21 The protection of interests of indians, more-
17. HAING, supra note 7, at 121-22. The strict French doctrine of separation of
powers did not find general acceptance in the newly independent Latin American repub-
lics of the nineteenth century; rather, the American checks and balances modification
was found to be more congenial. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
18. VANCE & CLAGETr, supra note 16, at 104-05; H. CLAGET, A GumE TO THE
LAw & LEGAL LITERATUR OF PERU 55 (1947).
19. HARiNG, supra note 7, at 136-37. See also E. Ruiz, LA MAGISTTURA IN-
DIANA 37-38 (1916); Malag6n-Barcel6, The Role of the Letrado in the Colonization of
America, 18 AMERIuCAS 1, 6-7 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Malag6n-Barcel6]; Kahle,
The Spanish Colonial Judiciary, 32 Sw. SOCIAL Scr. Q. 26, 31-33 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Kahle].
20. Kahle, supra note 19, at 26.
21. PARRY, supra note 9, at 199; Kahle, supra note 19, at 32; see Campbell, A
Colonial Establishment: Creole Domination of the Audiencia of Lima During the Late
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over, was one of the audiencia's more important functions. 22
In the interests of impartiality, the seventeenth century code, Re-
copilaci6n de las Leyes de las Indias, prescribed a semi-monastic life
for the audiencia judges, the number of which varied from four to eight-
een, depending on the importance of the territory.23 Many of the code
articles laid down strict rules of daily life for these judges, showing them
to be a highly specialized and respected professional group upon which
the crown placed particularly heavy reliance. For their many duties
and responsibilities, audiencia judges received salaries much higher
than those of any other colonial officials except viceroys, and consider-
ably higher than those paid to corresponding judges in Spain.24
The Portuguese judicial system in Brazil differed somewhat from
that in colonial Spain, although there were important similarities. Dur-
ing the sixty year period of Spanish-Portuguese union after Philip U1
of Spain inherited the crown of Portugal in 1580, for instance, the Con-
selho da India, resembling the Spanish Council of the Indies, was cre-
ated to administer the king's policies in Brazil. The Conselho da In-
dia, however, and its successor, the Overseas Council (Conselho Ul-
tramarino), did not have the judicial function of the Spanish Council
of the Indies. Final appellate jurisdiction resided in the Casa de Sup-
licagdo in Lisbon for a few captaincies general and in the relag6es in
Bahia or, after 1751, also in Rio de Janeiro for most of the Brazilian
captaincies general. As with the audiencia in Spanish America, the
relagdo acted as the principal check on the arbitrary exercise of power
by a Brazilian captain general.2 5 Relag6es were both judicial and
administrative bodies, but they were not subordinate to the captain gen-
eral. The harbinger of today's Supreme Court in Brazil finds its roots
in the relagdo.26
Eighteenth Century, 52 HISPANIc Am. HIsr. REv. 1, 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Campbell].
22. HARING, supra note 7, at 131. "The Indian very rapidly assimilated ...juri-
dical sense, and then defended himself against the acts of the colonizer, not with bows
and arrows, but with lawsuits." Malag6n-Barcel6, supra note 19, at 16-17. See J.
OsoRas, EL MEDIo Y LA LEGISLACION 133-34, 158, 164-65 (1918); Coy, Tustice for the
Indian in Eighteenth Century Mexico, 12 Am. J. LEGAL Isr. 41, 42-45, 49. Up
to forty percent of an audiencia's time was occupied with suits between indians, or be-
tween indians and spaniards. The indians, furthermore, were relieved in some regions
of legal costs and had attorneys designated to defend them in court. HAING, supra note
7, at 131. In some areas a special court, the juzgado de indios, eventually heard most
of the cases dealing with indians. Id.
23. Kahle, supra note 19, at 31; PsaRY, supra note 9, at 201-02.
24. PARRY, supra note 9, at 201-02. High salaries are maintained in some Latin
American countries today; see, e.g., Costa Rica in text accompanying note 102, infra.
25. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 9, 197, 359.
26. See D. ALDEN, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN CoLoNIAL BRAZIL 435-36 n.57 (1968);
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Even though the audiencia and relagdao were important institutions
in colonial America in curbing the arbitrary exercise of official power,
two points should be emphasized. First, these two partially judicial or-
gans were not upholding a higher law, natural or secular, against the
legislative or administrative acts of the king. On the contrary, audien-
cias and relagies were the most consistently loyal and effective institu-
tions of the colonial bureaucracyY Legality was defined by the king
and his councils. Aggrieved individuals could complain, and many
thousands did, against official action that was contrary to the king's
law. The second important fact to remember is that the New World
was enormous in size, especially compared to the Iberian peninsula.
The scattered pattern of settlement,28 the lack of resources, the tremen-
E. BORCHARD, GUIDE To THE LAW & LEGAL LrrITtRURE OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL &
CHILE 235-36 (1917); [hereinafter cited as BoRcARnD]; Marchant, The Political and
Legal Framework of Brazilian Life, MODERN BRAZIL 96, 123 (J. Saunders ed. 1971);
C. PRADO, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 350, 353, 355-57, 359-60,
373-74 (1967).
27. PARRY, supra note 9, at 202. For much of the latter eighteenth century, how-
ever, American-born Europeans had substantial influence over these high courts. This
led to the royal policy of securing control by naming only those born on the Iberian
peninsula, especially after 1780. Burkholder, From Creole to Peninsular: The Trans-
formation of the Audiencia of Lima, 52 ISPANic AM. HIST. REv. 395, 395-97, 413
(1972); see D. BRADiNG, MnaRs Am MERCHANTS IN BoURBoN, Mmxrco, 1763-1810,
40-42 (1971); Campbell, supra note 21, 1, 3, 10; Schwartz, Family, Friends and Em-
pire: Magistracy and Society in Colonial Brazil, 50 HIsPANIc AM. HIsT. REv. 715
(1970).
28. Table 1 presents a rough impression of )fhe distribution of the 22 million peo-
ple living in Latin America at the beginning of their period of political independence
from Europe. This can be compared with the distribution of 286 million people living
in Latin America today in Table 9, infra.
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El Salvador1  222,000*
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dous distances involved, the often complex nature of judicial procedure
in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, corruption, especially at lower
levels in the hierarchy-all naturally made the task of extending royal
authority in an effective manner to all parts of the colonies a difficult
one. The actual administration of justice probably only approximated
the model in and near the larger towns where audiencas and relagaes
were located.29 Outside these areas, large landowners frequently ruled
arbitrarily; from their rule there was no appeal. 30
To sum up, the principal task of government during the colonial
period was to adjudicate between competing interests. The audiencia
and relagdo were the institutions that fulfilled this function. The high
salaries received by the magistrates, in addition, reflect the prestige and
importance of their position in the Iberian imperial governments. The
colonial government was one of checks and balances, of divided au-
* The following population estimates are for years other than 1830: Costa Rica
(1838); Cuba (1827); El Salvador (1841); Guatemala (1839); Honduras (1838); and
Nicaragua (1838).
1. These five nations were part of the Central American Federation until 1839.
2. Cuba was part of the Spanish Empire until 1898.
3. The Dominican Republic, previously known as Santo Domingo, was part of
Haiti from 1821 to 1844. Its population here has been subtracted from that of Haiti.
4. Panama was a department of Colombia until 1903.
SOURCES: See A. BANKS, CRoss-PoLrrY TimE-SERims DATA 4-51 (1971); except
STAISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LArmn AMERICA 1972, 67 (1974) for Cuba.
Surprisingly, there were probably fewer people living in Latin America in 1830 than
when the Europeans first landed. It is estimated, for instance, that there were
25,000,000 indians living in Mexico in 1500. PARRY, supra note 9, at 215. In every
area of the New World, the European invasion was followed by a steep decline in the
numbers of the native population, caused chiefly by foreign pestilence: smallpox, ma-
laria and yellow fever. Id. at 213, 215-16. The estimated number of indians in Mexico
by 1580 was 1,900,000. Id. at 220. Even though there were huge numbers of negro
slaves imported into Brazil, especially during the eighteenth century, their death rate was
also extremely high. R. FOGEL & S. ENGEaMAN, TIME ON THE CRoss 14, 16, 25 (1974).
Although indians had substantial access to the high courts, most judicial review
probably dealt with those of European ancestry living in Latin America, whose number
had risen from 225,000 in 1600 to 3,400,000 by 1800. SCnwARTz, supra note 6, at 31,
247; A WmGus & R. D'EgA, LATn AMERICAN HISTORY 93 (5th ed. 1963).
29. Brazilians were served by high courts in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. In addi-
tion, there were thirteen audiencias in Spanish America during the latter part of the
eighteenth century. There were two audiencias for Mexico (one each in Guadalajara
and Mexico City), one for the Caribbean islands located in Santo Domingo, one for
all of Central America in Guatemala, one each for Panama, Venezuela, Colombia and
Ecuador, two for Peru (one each in Lima and Cuzco), one for both Bolivia and Para-
guary, one for Chile and one for both Argentina and Uruguay. PIERsoN & GIL, supra
note 12, at 44-45.
30. 1 A. CAMPiLLO, TRATADO ELEMENTAL DE PRocDnIMENTos Cnrus 25 (1924).
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thority and responsibility. The audiencia and relagao, forerunners of
today's high courts, exercised the principal restraint on the arbitrary
use of power by viceroys or captains general. These agencies protec-
ted what rights the colonials and indians had under the king's law.
When the age of revolution arrived in Latin America at the beginning
of the nineteenth century, new institutions were fashioned. They were
not completely hewn from the abstract political ideology of the time,
however. Many were based on the practical experience of the pre-
vious centuries.
Independence and the First Latin American Constitutions
During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Spanish and
Portuguese empires in America, which had existed for more than three
centuries, were broken up. The struggles for independence represen-
ted the first efforts of the patriots to liquidate the colonial system in
government and society. For example, there were frequent attempts
to remove legislative and executive duties from the high courts and to
restrict the judiciary to the administration of justice. 31
In the nations which emerged from the Spanish empire, the re-
moval of the mother country as a common enemy severed a bond of
cohesion; divisive political forces erupted throughout the Americas. In
fact, the next few decades in many regions of Latin America could be
best characterized as in a condition of anarchy.32 Independence had
brought pressing economic problems.3 8 The principal cause of protests
and revolutions, however, was the delay in reaching a consensus as to
the form of government to be adopted. In spite of unsatisfactory ex-
periments with monarchy in Haiti and Mexico, debate persisted in many
countries between advocates of monarchy and those in favor of a re-
public. Where republics were established there were lengthy conflicts
between federalists and those in favor of centralized government, be-
tween the city commercial class and rural landowners, between those
31. See Campbell, supra note 21, at 19.
32. For example, Bolivia during the remainder of the nineteenth century had more
than 70 revolts; there were 30 presidents, six of whom were assassinated. In Paraguay,
only six presidents were able to serve for the entire legal term. J. YCAZA, SoCIoLoGIA
Dn LA PoLrncA IsPANo-AMERICANA 157 (1950).
33. Many of the new states were inadequately prepared for a self-supporting econ-
omy. Market rights in Spain were lost, and the abolition of indian tribute removed a
production incentive. Moreover, the financing of wars brought fiscal burdens with
which few of the emergent nations were able to successfully cope. PmRsoN & GiL, su-
pra note 12, at 106.
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favoring separation of church and state and those supporting clerical-
ism, and between ideological conservatives and liberals.3 4
The first constitutions of the Latin American nations are important
because they indicate political traditions as well as the controversial is-
sues which emerged. The political thought of Hobbes, Locke, Rous-
seau and Montesquieu had become well-known to the educated elite
in the Americas, as censorship became less strict and travel abroad by
colonials increased. These writings contained theoretical discussions of
the practical issues that later confronted the authors of the Constitutions
of the United States and France. The influence of social contract theo-
ries, especially as they related to issues of natural rights, and ideas on
the proper functions for a limited government, particularly the separa-
tion of powers, pervaded the constitutional formulations of the revolu-
tionary era. Many leaders of the cause for independence in Latin
America, familiar with constitutional developments in the United States
and France, drew on translations of the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen and certain major political documents
of the United States, including the Declaration of Independence, the
constitutions of Maryland, Massachusetts and Virginia. the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution of 1789.35
The history of Latin American constitutional theory and practice
portrays the elaboration of a set of values-including liberty, equality,
justice, and the sanctity of private property-widely shared with other
western nations. One hundred and fifty years of experience, however,
amply demonstrates that these values are not self-executing. Their
implications are by no means unambiguous. On the contrary, these val-
ues are frequently contradictory. Freedom of contract and the private
ownership of property, for example, have clashed with modem notions
of social justice. Similarly, concepts of equality may conflict with no-
tions of liberty, and so on. Furthermore, the values incorporated into
Latin American constitutions have never been universally accepted.
All Latin American governments are obliged by their constitutions
to respect the basic rights of man enumerated in the provisions that de-
fine liberty, equality, justice and property. In construing these matters,
Latin American regimes are often misunderstood. Since political un-
rest impedes the proper functioning of political and legal institutions,
all too often generalizations are based on such situations of unrest.
The generalities in turn lead to assertions that the constitutional guaran-
34. Id. at 104; LAimERT, supra note 3, at 264-66.
35. PIERSON & GILm, supra note 12, at 107.
['Vol. 2
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tees are deceptive and that Latin Americans' desire for liberty and jus-
tice expresses itself in words and not action. This conclusion applies
to some nations generally, but for the large nations with major popula-
tions it is true only for relatively short periods of time."6
There have been two major epochs in the establishment of con-
stitutional guarantees in Latin America. The first stage includes the
decades subsequent to the wars for independence, influenced by the
liberal thought of the eighteenth century. 7 The second stage dates
from the Mexican Revolution. Beginning in 1910, the first successful
socialist revolt spelled out its goals of social justice and expressed them
in the Constitution of 1917. This document, emphasizing nationalism,
the concept that private property must serve a social function and con-
taining a social program for land reform and the protection of labor,
has had an important impact on constitution-making since that time.3"
The central issue that faced the framers of Latin American con-
stitutions, and has confronted western political theorists in general, was
the problem of ensuring that governmental power, which is necessary
for the realization of constitutional values, be constrained so that it
would not impinge upon these same values. 9 The resolution of the
problem lies in a system of effective restraints upon government ac-
tion. Such controls involve some division of power, since those who
are expected to do the restraining must act with some authority. The
principal division of governmental power has generally taken one, and
frequently two forms. First, there is a functional division into legisla-
36. LA MERT, supra note 3, at 272-73. Many countries spent some of their his-
tory since independence under dictators, especially during the nineteenth century.
There have continued to be several cases of dictatorship in the twentieth century: Ven-
ezuela from 1908 to 1935, the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961, and Haiti, Para-
guay and Nicaragua for much of this century. Argentina suffered oppression until about
1850, and Mexico until much later, but the situation in these large countries today is
different. Brazil has seldom known egregious constitutional violations until recently,
and they do not often occur in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica or Uruguay.
Id. at 273-74. See text accompanying notes 75-76 and 119-20 infra.
37. See text accompanying note 35 supra. In these early constitutions one finds
various basic rights: freedom of speech, press, petition, assembly and association; free-
dom of movement; fundamental guarantees of fair procedure for persons accused of
crime; the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus; equal protection of the law; and
the right to private property. LAmERT, supra note 3, at 280-86; PIERSON & GiL, supra
note 12, at 192-94.
38. LAMBERT, supra note 3, at 273, 276-80; PIERSON & GiL, supra note 12, at 184-
85.
39. See M. VIE, CONSTrrrun NALISM AND Tr SEPARAnoN OF PoWRs 1 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as VmE]; see also Grant, Judicial Control of Legislation, 3 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 186 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Grant].
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tive, executive and judicial spheres. Second, there may be a territorial
division of sovereignty between a central government and smaller
political units.40
Some form of the functional separation of powers is clearly re-
quired in order for courts to have the authority to declare statutes and
other governmental action contrary to the constitution. This is, never-
theless, insufficient. The separation of powers doctrine taken to its
logical conclusion, as the French had done after 1789,41 or as advocated
by the Jeffersonian Republicans, is incompatible with the idea that one
branch of government can interfere with the duties of the other
branches by invalidating their acts. The establishment of judicial re-
view, like the veto power, depends on the acceptance of checks and
balances.42 No nation today subscribes to a pure doctrine of separation
of powers, whereby each branch of the government must be confined
to the exercise of certain duties and not allowed to encroach upon the
functions of the other branches. Modem constitutional theories all es-
pouse some form of mixed government.43
The Beginnings of Latin American Judicial Review
Every one of the Latin American nations has had since independ-
ence some period of explicit or implied authorization of judicial review
of the constitutionality of legislative and executive action.44 Particularly
in regard to judicial review of legislation, the United States' influence
has been important.45 The framers of the American Constitution were
40. See C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT & DE.ocRAcY 172 (4th
ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDRICH 11.
41. See J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITON 16-19 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as MERRYMAN I].
42. See VILE, supra note 39, at 157-58; N. DOWLING & G. GUNTHER, CASES & MA-
TERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22, 26, 30 (7th ed. 1965).
43. See VILE, supra note 39, at 2-6, 13; Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers:
An Essay on the Vitality of a Constitutional Idea, 52 ORE. L. REv. 211, 216-19 (1973).
44. See Table 2 infra. Henry Abraham defines judicial review as "the power of
any court to hold unconstitutional and hence unenforceable any law,. any official action
based upon a law, and any other action by a public official that it deems . . . to be
in conflict with the Basic Law." H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICuL PRocEss: AN INTRODUC-
TORY ANALYSIS OF THE CounTs OF =n UNrrED STATES, ENGLAND AND FRANCE 283 (2d
ed. 1968). For similar definitions, see BEcKER, supra note 3, at 204; G. SCHUBERT,
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITCS 188 (1960); and E. McWINNEY JUDIcL L REVIEW 13 (4th
ed. 1969). In this article, "judicial review" is used according to Professor Abraham's
definition, except that, unless otherwise stated, reference is made to the judicial consid-
eration of legislation and executive action, and not to the hierarchical function of deter-
mining the legality of inferior judicial action.
45. In M. MONTAgO, LAS IDEAS PoLMCAS DE JOSE MANUEL EsrRADA 18 (1944),
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divided on the issue of the supremacy of legislative versus judicial
power. While Federalists were especially sensitive to the opportunities
of arbitrary usurpations of power by a legislature, the Jeffersonian Re-
publicans were more concerned about judicial improprieties. John
Adams found Hamilton's discussion of judicial review in The Federal-
ist4 most congenial and found comfort in Justice Marshall's opinion in
Marbuy v. Madison,47 convincingly asserting the Supreme Court's
power in this area.48  In Europe, on the other hand, idealists were
greatly concerned with securing bills of rights, but they gave little atten-
tion to securing sufficient legal guarantees for their enforcement.
After the revolution in France, suspicion of the reactionary courts mili-
tated against efforts to give them the power of judicial review.40 State
positivism, as expressed in the dogma of the absolute sovereignty of
the state, coupled with Rousseau's formulation of the strict separation
of powers, formed a matrix into which judicial review could not fit.
Moreover, such review was believed not necessary, since the legisla-
ture, as the only directly elected branch of the government, alone could
respond to the popular will."9 The European tradition of resolving
fundamental issues, consequently, is by explicit legislative enactment.
This has resulted in codification of such principles as freedom of ex-
pression and assembly. The European practice has not, accordingly,
favored judicial development of broad constitutional rights.51 Only
since World War I has a type of judicial review evolved, usually estab-
the many Spanish translations of influential treatises during the period 1855-80 dealing
with the United States Constitution are enumerated, including translations of THE FED-
ERALIST (1788); G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1854-58); J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERI-
CAN LAw (1826-30); F. LIEBER, ON CraL LmERTY & SELF-GoVERNMENT (3d ed. 1875);
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1834); and
J. TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT AND CONsTrrTTONAL LAw (1867). PIERSON
& GIL, supra note 12, at 267 n.3. See S. AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSrrruTIONAL LAW
28-34, 49-56, 73-87 (1943); BORCHamD, supra note 26, at 286-90, 318-19; cf. C. Fiuun-
RICH, THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALism ABROAD 12 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as FRIEDRICH 11]. The Spanish translation of A. DE TOCQuEVILLE, LA DEMOCRA-
TIE EN AMERiQUB (1835) in 1837 and in later editions also had an important impact
in Latin America. Eder I, supra note 4, at 571 n.5.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. FIEDRICH I, supra note 40, at 252; FIEDRICH II, supra note 45, at 78-79.
49. Id. See also Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European
Antecedents and Adoptations, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1207, 1208, 1211-12 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Cappelletti & Adams].
50. See MERRYMAN I, supra note 41, at 23-24.
51. FRIEDRICH I, supra note 40, at 252-53.
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lished in a special constitutional court.52
Although both the United States' practice of judicial review and
the European tradition of strict separation of powers influenced the au-
thors of Latin American constitutions, the former seems to have had
greater impact. The judicial institution, however, was not imported in-
tact. Rather, the North American and European traditions stimu-
lated the Latin American framers into thinking out the various alterna-
tives confronting them in the years following independence.53
The power to interpret the constitution was expressly or implicitly
vested in the judiciary in most Latin American nations during the nine-
teenth century. Although such a provision was not immediately acted
upon in some countries, it served as a basis for the evolution of judi-
cial review, especially of the constitutionality of legislation, in the twen-
tieth century. 54
Table 2: Earliest Explicit or Implied Authorization of Judicial Review
in Latin American Constitutions or Statutes by Country'.
Habeas Corpus
Review of or Amparo




Central American Federation 1824
Chile 1925 1925
Colombia 1886 1964
Costa Rica 1821 1847
Cuba 1901 1901
Dominican Republic 1844 1947
Ecuador 1845 1929




52. See Cappelletti & Adams, supra note 49, at 1207-08, 1214. See generally MAX-
PLANCK-BERL INSTrTuT rfR AUSLANDISHES 6FFENTLICHES REcHT UND V6LKERRE HT,
VERFAssuNGsOmIcHTsBAROrIT IN DER GEGENWART (1962).
53. Cf. FRIEDRICH II, supra note 45, at 11. Latin American framers seem to have
followed, in large part, the advice of de Tocqueville: "Let us not turn to America in
order slavishly to copy the institutions she has fashioned for herself but in order that
we may better understand what suits us; let us look there for in truction rather than
models... ." A. DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA xiv (0. Mayer ed. 1969),
in de Tocqueville's preface to the twelfth edition.
54. See, e.g., R. BAcKus & P. EDER, A GuiDE TO THE LAW AND LwAL LrrlAuTntE
oF COLOMBA 11 (1943); C. HAINES, TnE AMERICAN DocTRnE oF JuIcIAL SuREmAcy
573-646 (2d ed. rev. 1959); Furnish, The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws, 18 AM. I. Comip.









1. In several countries, even though judicial review was at least implicitly au-
thorized, it was not immediately implemented. In Peru, for example, judicial review
of legislation has never been invoked, although executive decrees and regulations have
been held unconstitutional. Furnish, The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws, 18 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 91, 98-110 (1971).
2. Habeas corpus has been called by a variety of names, including writ of ex-
hibition of the person. In many countries it has been broadened to provide protection
not only against bodily restraint and arbitrary imprisonment, but also against violation
of various individual freedoms. J. LAmmERT, supra note 3, at 289.
SOURCES: See J. LAMBERT, LATIN AMERICA 274 (1967); H. CLAGETT, A GUIDE
TO TnE LAw & LEGAL LITERATURE OF BOLIVIA 47 (1947); Camargo, The Right to Ju-
dicial Protection, 3 LAwYER AMERICAS 191, 194-200 (1971); Eder, Habeas Corpus
Disembodied: The Latin American Experience, TWENTITH CENTURY COMPARATIVE
& CONFLICTS LAw 463, 465-76 (1961); Eder, Judicial Review in Latin America, 21
OHIO ST. L.J. 570, 571-609 (1960).
Table 2 details the earliest explicit or implied authorization of ju-
dicial review in Latin American constitutions or statutes. Most of the
countries recognized the possibility of judicial review of legislation in
the nineteenth century.55 About half, furthermore, adopted in this
same period the writ of habeas corpus or something similar to protect
freedom of movement.5 In some nations habeas corpus, as a writ used
to protect one from unconstitutional executive action, was expanded to
include the protection of other or all individual liberties, often under
the name of amparo in Spanish America and mandado de seguranga
in Brazil. 57 There were, however, some significant exceptions to this
general trend. Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, for instance, were strongly
influenced by the French interpretation of the separation of powers
which precluded judicial review. Guardianship of the constitution was
left to the legislature until 1925 in Chile, until 1934 in Uruguay, and
until 1940 in Paraguay. To this day, moreover, the Ecuadorian Su-
preme Court shares the power of constitutional review with the legis-
lature.58
55. Eder I, supra note 4, at 571-609.
56. Eder, Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience, TWN-
TIETH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW, 465-76 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Eder Ill. But habeas corpus was slow to be implemented in some countries. See,
e.g., W. STOKES, HONDURAS 140-41 (1950).
57. Eder II, supra note 56, at 467-70.
58. Eder I, supra note 4, at 572-73, 585, 607. For a perceptive discussion of judi-
cial review in Latin America see Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, 35 Omio
ST. L.i. 785 (1974).
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The Reality of Latin American Judicial Review
in the Twentieth Century
We have seen that all Latin American governments are required
by their constitutions to respect the basic rights of man enumerated in
the articles that define liberty, equality, justice and property. Courts,
moreover, have generally been given the authority to declare legislative
and executive action contrary to the constitution and thus invalid.
The extent to which judicial review is an effective restraint on un-
constitutional government activity, nevertheless, is essentially an empir-
ical question. It is, furthermore, inextricably intertwined with the con-
cept of judicial independence. Paraphrasing Theodore Becker's inter-
pretation, judicial independence is the degree to which judges believe
they can decide, and do decide, disputes, consistent with their own con-
ception of the judicial role in interpreting the law, in opposition to what
those who have political power think about or desire in such matters."
This definition, first, implies that there are degrees of judicial independ-
ence. There may be partial political control of judicial behavior; it
is more than a simple dichotomous variable. 60 Costa Rica may have
a more independent supreme court than Mexico, for example, and they
both may be more independent than the high court in Nicaragua.
Second, independence denotes freedom from certain sources of influ-
ence-represented here as opposition from governmental power em-
bodied in the legislative and executive branches."'
Following this definition of judicial independence, it seems clear
that a judiciary which is not independent to some degree cannot effec-
59. BECKER, supra note 3, at 144. See J. BLONDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMs-
PARATIvE GOVERNMENT 441-42 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BLONDEL]; Eckhoff, Impar-
tiality, Separation of Powers, and Judicial Independence, SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
LAW : 1965, 11 (F. Schmidt ed. 1965); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 263.
60. BLONDEL, supra note 59, at 437. See Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party
and "Judicial Independence": 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REv. 967, 972-75 (1969).
61. It is possible to conceive of a totalitarian society where judges decide conflicts
according to a pervasive ideology that is substantially shared with the political elites.
In this case, even though there might exist freedom from governmental influence, if
there was no opposition to nonjudicial political power, there would be no independence
under the definition adopted here. See BECKER, supra note 3, at 14, 141.
An issue that is outside the scope of this article concerns the impartiality of judges.
The judge in the totalitarian illustration may be impartial even if he is not independent;
he is impartial to the extent he decides disputes objectively according to the specific
guidelines society has established. See BECKER, supra note 3, at 25-26, 141. Judicial
independence is hardly a closed issue in the United States. See generally Hearings on
the Independence of Federal Judges, before the Subcommittee on Sparation of Powers
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
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tively undertake constitutional review. Independence, consequently,
is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for effective judicial re-
view.62 Independence of the judiciary, moreover, may occur without
any provision for judicial review-as it has in England. In general,
nevertheless, a judiciary's independence is related to the extent judicial
review is exercised, and the power of judicial review is related to the
actual degree of independence.63
Effective judicial review, in Latin America as elsewhere, is a rela-
tive phenomenon. It may make little sense, as a result, to conclude
that at a certain period in history, judicial review in the United States,
or Chile, was a powerful or weak political force. Such a statement be-
comes meaningful only when it takes on the attribute of comparison."4
Was federal judicial review in the first half of the nineteenth century
in the United States ineffective after Marbury v. Madison just because
no federal law was declared void for another fifty years? 65 Is it effec-
tive today if sixty-five percent of the federal public administrators be-
lieve judicial review is effective? In part the answer depends on how
one measures judicial review. But equally important is the definition
of "weak," "effective" or "powerful" judicial review. Terms such as
these can be given meaning only by comparison-either across time,
between political units at a given point in time, or by combining both
dimensions. Thus, it may facilitate explanation to state that federal ju-
dicial review was more effective in the United States, returning to our
example above, from the Civil War to World War II than from Mar-
bury v. Madison until the Civil War because seventy-four statutes (or
parts thereof) were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court af-
ter 1860.6 Similarly, a statement that Colombian judicial review is a
powerful safeguard of individual constitutional liberties may be signifi-
cant if seventy-five percent of the public officials believe judicial re-
view is an effective deterrent to their action whereas an equivalent per-
centage in the United States is sixty-five percent.
By comparison, therefore, accurate assertions concerning the
effectiveness of judicial review in various Latin American nations can
62. Certain institutional structures and procedures, of course, must also be pro-
vided.
63. BECKER, supra note 3, at 214-15.
64. See generally Merryman, Comparative Law and Scientific Explanation, LAw
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 81
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Merryman 1I].
65. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMmRCAN LAw 301 (1973).
66. See R. CAM, THE SUPREME COURT & JUDICIAL REvi w 204 (1942) [herein-
after cited as CARm].
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be made. Inquiry, of course, need not end here. One might next ask
what are the political and economic factors associated with judicial
independence and effective judicial review: what causes a strong
judiciary? For instance, the type of political system (whether demo-
cratic or authoritarian) might be an important variable explaining why
some nations have strong court systems. Does a nondemocratic regime
imply a dependent judiciary, largely submissive to the executive
branch? Similarly, it might be hypothesized that effective judicial re-
view correlates significantly with the national level of economic de-
velopment. By investigating these kinds of questions, it is possible to
speak more intelligently about judicial review in Latin America.
The definition of judicial review adopted previously 67 needs to be
put into operation. Before judicial review in Uruguay can be compared
with judicial review in Brazil, it is necessary to be able to measure what
we mean by judicial revew. A recipe for chocolate cake, to illustrate,
is an operational definition for such a cake because it details what oper-
ations and components are necessary to produce it. To measure
degrees of effectiveness of judicial review, a detailed set of instructions
is necessary to classify those degrees unambiguously. 6
Table 3: Behavioral Determinants of Effective Judicial Review
Indicator
I. Number of laws, decrees, and regulations
(or part thereof) declared
unconstitutional annually
II. Number of writs (habeas corpus,
amparo, mandado de seguranga)
filed annually, per million
population
III. Percentage of writs decided against
the government
IV. Number of cases filed against govern-
ment agencies annually alleging
unconstitutional official action,
per million population
V. Percentage of cases decided against
the government
Effectiveness of judicial review
Code1
One point for each
declaration of
unconstitutionality
One point for each
20 writs
One point for each
5 percentage points
One point for each
20 cases
One point for each
5 percentage points
Total points
1. The code used here is illustrative; a balance among laws, writs and cases
should be developed in conjunction with the data gathered for the indicators.
67. See note 44 supra.
68. H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 12 (2d ed. 1972); J. SuioN, BAsic REsnAscH
METHODs n SociAL ScrNc- 16 (1969).
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Table 3 details certain indicators which taken together serve as
an operational definition of judicial review.69 They measure the activ-
ity of courts in carrying out the judicial review function: assessing the
constitutionality of laws and other legal norms as well as deciding cases
and writs brought against government agencies.
To compare one nation with another, the indicators measuring the
number of writs and cases filed are adjusted for population. It is not
necessary to hold population constant, alternatively, when measuring
the number of legal norms declared unconstitutional since one agrarian
law, for instance, can regulate both a country the size of Honduras and
one the size of Brazil.
If we lived in a world where perfect information existed, the indi-
cators in Table 3 would allow us to compare the effectiveness of judicial
review in the twenty Latin American nations with a high degree of reli-
ability. Such information does not exist. There is, in fact, a dearth
of judicial statistics for Latin American courts.7 0
Table 4: Substitute Behavioral Determinants of Effective
Judicial Review
Indicator Code'
I. Percentage of legislators who believe One point for each
judicial review is effective 5 percentage points
II. Percentage of public administrators One point for each
(including police) who 'believe 5 percentage points
judicial review is effective
III. Percentage of judges who believe One point for each 10judicial review is effective percentage points
69. For a discussion suggestive of the indicators adopted in Table 3, see BECKER, su-
pra note 3, at 147, 151-52, 214-15; BLONDEL, supra note 59, at 442; CAM'l, supra note
66, at 204-06, 224, 227-28; Toharia, The Spanish Judiciary 190-93 (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, 1974, on file in Yale University Library) [hereinafter cited as Toharia]; The Su-
preme Court, 1961 Term: Foreword, 76 HAnv. L. RPv. 75, 81-82 (1962), THn FED-
ERAL JuDiciAL SYSTEM 103 (Jahnige & Goldman eds. 1968); Schwarz, supra note 3, at
313-32; and Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes toward Federal Administrative Agen-
cies 1947-1956, 14 VAND. L. REv. 473, 482-502 (1961), THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYs-
TEM 230-44 (Jahnige & Goldman eds. 1968).
70. This situation is slowly changing. SL.ADE (for Studies in Law and Develop-
ment), a research enterprise centered at Stanford Law School, is undertaking the study
of a large series of indicators that measure the complex of legal actors, institutions,
processes, norms-all in the context of the legal culture-that comprise selected legal
systems in Latin America and Mediterranean Europe. Data collected are comparative:
between regions within each nation, across countries and over the period 1945-1970.
Publication of the results is projected for 1976. See Merryman II, supra note 64, at
101-03, for a brief description of the Stanford project.
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IV. Percentage of general population One point for each
who believe judicial review is 10 percentage points
effective
Effectiveness of judicial review Total points
1. This code is illustrative. It may be more representative of reality if a high
percentage of police or legislators believe judicial review is effective than the same
percentage for judges. The number of points assigned depend upon an investigator's
theory. A more elaborate code could be devised if one were able to ascertain greater
differentiation among responses to questions about judicial effectiveness.
Table 4, consequently, presents another approach in operationaliz-
ing the concept of effective judicial review. 7' The idea behind this
table is that effective judicial review (Table 3) in some' objective sense
will be reflected by a large percentage of people believing it effective.
The distance between belief and reality, however, may vary from one
society to another, and also among groups within a nation. The relia-
bility of these indicators, as a result, may be less than those presented
in Table 3. Perhaps most important, however, is the extent to which
people have confidence in the effectiveness of judicial review. It is
not sufficient that judicial review be effective in an objective sense.
According to this theory, Table 4 would be more meaningful than
Table 3.72
Table 5: Structural Determinants of Effective Judicial Review
Indicator Code1
Independence of supreme court judges
I. Recruitment
2
A. Appointment by judiciary 2 points
B. Appointment by executive with checks (by
legislature or judiciary) or by legislature 1 point
C. Appointment by executive alone 0 points
71. For a discussion suggestive of the indicators used, see BEcKER, supra note 3,
at 146, 151; CARR, supra note 66, at 206-08; PIERSON & GIL, supra note 12, at 281-82;
Toharia, supra note 69, at 410-12; Murphy, The Problem of Compliance by Police De-
partments, 44 TExAs L. Rlv. 939, at 939-46 (1966), THm FFDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
353-57 (Jahnige & Goldman eds. 1968); Address by President F. Roosevelt, March 9,
1937, The President Attacks the Court, THE FEDmRAL JUDICT\L SYSTEM 341-42
(Jahnige & Goldman eds. 1968); Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme
Court Decision, 53 AM. POL. Sci. R.v. 777 (1959), Thm FEDEPL JuDiciAL SYSTEM
343-53 (Jahnige & Goldman eds. 1968); Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1573-74 (1967); and Note, Congressional Reversal of Su-
preme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HIv. L. REv. 1324 (1958), THm FEDERAL Ju-
DIcIAL SYSTEM 334-40 (Jahnige & Goldman eds. 1968).
72. See Eckhoff, supra note 59, at 12. I am also grateful to Professor Merryman
for this point.
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11. Tenure
A. Lifetime 3 points
B. De facto lifetime (automatic renewal with
good behavior) 2 points
C. More than six years 1 point
D. Six years or less 0 points
III. Salary
A. Equal or greater than executive minister 2 points
B. Equal or greater than full time law professor 1 point
C. Less than full time law professor 0 points
Restrictions in making constitutional complaint
against government
IV. Scope of competence
A. Review of all jurisdictions3  3 points
B. Excludes one important jurisdiction (ad-
ministrative law, labor law, agrarian law) 2 points
C. Excludes two important jurisdictions 1 point
D. Excludes three or more important
jurisdictions 0 points
V. Political questions
A. Moderate political question exclusion 1 point
B. Substantial exclusion 0 points
VI. Case and controversy requirement
A. Direct review of constitutional question 1 point
B. Incidental review with other issues 0 points
VII. Availability of review
A. Diffused throughout lower courts 1 point
B. Concentrated in supreme court 0 points
Effects of constitutional ruling
VIII. Efficiency of review
A. Action or norm invalid for all (erga omnes) 2 points
B. Invalid only between parties (inter partes),
but stare decisis can provide general
invalidity 1 point
C. Invalid only inter partes 0 points
Effectiveness of judicial review Total points
1. This code is illustrative.
2. The notion that appointment of judges by organs outside the executive and
legislative branches might further judicial independence is suneested in the INT'L
COMMISSION OF JuRISTS, No. 11, at 4, February, 1961.
3. Supreme court review does not have to include the electoral court nor military
court to qualify for 3 points, since most matters from these tribunals have tradi-
tionally been outside the scope of judicial review.
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A third and even less reliable set of indicators is listed in Table
5. These are the structural variables normally found in the literature
on judicial review. 3 In fact, most assertions about effective judicial
review are based on the conditions of tenure and the selection pro-
cedures for supreme court judges.7 4
The principal shortcoming in using structural determinants to
measure the effectiveness of judicial review is the propensity to confuse
legal prerequisites with reality. It is possible that both structural and
behavioral indicators would lead to approximately the same ranking of
Latin American nations for the effectiveness of judicial review. We
cannot make that determination, however, until information is made
available to complete Tables 3 or 4.
Table 6: Effectiveness of Judicial Review in Latin America,
by Country
Scope of Effects Effectiveness
Recruitment Tenure Competence of Ruling Score'
Argentina 1 3 3 0 7
Bolivia 1 1 2 0 4
Brazil 1 3 3 2 9
Chile2  1 2 3 2 8
Colombia 1 3 3 2 9
Costa Rica 1 2 3 2 8
Cuba 0 3 0 2 5
Dominican Republic 1 0 2 0 3
Ecuador 0 0 2 0 2
El Salvador 1 0 2 2 5
Guatemala 1 0 2 2 5
Haiti 0 1 3 0 4
Honduras 1 0 2 0 3
Mexico 1 3 3 1 8
Nicaragua 1 3 3 0 7
Panama 0 1 2 2 5
73. For discussion suggestive of the indicators used in Table 5, see BEcKER, supra
note 3, at 142, 148, 150, 206-09; BLONDEL, supra note 59, at 438-39, 444-56, 538; M.
CAPPELLETrI, JunrcuA Ruvmw IN TmE CoNTm oRARY WoRLD 46-66, 69-88 (1971); I-L
CLAGETr, THE ADmINSTRATiON OF JUSTICE IN IATiN AmERiCA 32-40, 55-98 (1952);
FRIEDmCH I, supra note 40, at 115-18; LAiMERT, supra note 3, at 292-95; PIERSON &
GiL, supra note 12, at 273-75, 278-81, 285-88; Toharia I, supra note 69, at 8-13, 188-
93, 270, 382-86, 400-06, 445-48; Clagett, Law and Court Systems, GovnNmNr AND
PoLITIcs IN LATIN AMERIcA 353-66 (H. Davis ed. 1958); Eder I, supra note 4, at 610-
12; Grant, supra note 39, at 187-89; Schwarz, supra note 3, at 264-65, 330.
74. Vines, Courts as Political and Governmental Agencies, PoLrrTcs IN THE
AmERICAN STATES 257 (1965).
['Vol. 2
CONSTITUTION IN LATIN AMERICA
Paraguay 0 0 2 0 2
Peru3  0 3 1 0 4
Uruguay 1 1 3 0 5
Venezuela 1 1 3 2 7
1. Based on the sum of four indicators from Table 5, calculated as of January
1, 1975. If the legislature normally participates in the selection of judges, but it was
temporarily suspended in January, 1975, "recruitment" would be coded "C" in Table
5 and listed with zero points in column one.
2. The recruitment and tenure figures are averages for the supreme court, con-
stitutional court, and the contralorfa. Scope of competence and effects of ruling are
cumulative for all three institutions. See text accompanying notes 93-98, infra.
3. There is no judicial review of the constitutionality of laws; there is, however,
habeas corpus review of executive action and the "popular action" to review the con-
stitutionality of executive decrees and regulations.
SouRCEs: See 4 A. PEASLEE, CoNsTturIoNs OF NATIONS (3d rev. ed. 1970);
WORLD PEAcE THRouGH LAw CENTER, LAW & JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF NATIONS (1965);
CONSiTtrMONS OF THE COUNTRES OF THE WORLD (Blaustein & Flanz ed. 1971-74);
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ColVARhnTrvE LAW (V. Knapp ed. 1972-73); THE
STATESMAN'S YEAR-BooK 1974-75 (J. Paxton ed. 1974).
Table 6 ranks all twenty Latin American countries according to
the present estimated effectiveness of their judicial review. It is based
on four of the indicators in Table 5, and thus should be considered pro-
visional. It was impossible to find current data on supreme court
salaries as well as the political question exclusion for every Latin
American nation. In addition, even though extensive information
exists on the "case and controversy" requirement and the availability
of review (concentrated in the supreme court or extended to lower
courts), it was too confusing to be presented here. For instance, many
countries have multiple procedures for deciding constitutional issues,
depending on whether one lives in the capital, whether one is complain-
ing about a law, about a decree by one ministry or by another, or about
an official's discretionary action. For this reason, these two theoreti-
cally interesting variables may not be practical for measuring the effec-
tiveness of judicial review.
One additional warning should be made about using structural
indicators to measure the effectiveness of judicial review. Since World
War II, there have been hundreds of declarations or extensions of a
state of siege in the Latin American countries. The state of siege is
a constitutional measure-sometimes known as state of emergency or
state of national defense-designed to provide for the security of the
nation in times of emergency due to external attack or serious disturb-
ances of the public order which the government is unable to control
by normal action. What does a state of siege mean for judicial review?
It temporarily grants extraordinary powers to the executive branch and
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permits the suspension or restriction of certain constitutional liberties."
Even though the state of siege is a common occurrence in Latin
America, it occurs in some nations with much less frequency than in
others, and when it does occur, it is generally a temporary phenomenon.
In this article, consequently, one should consider the "normal" situation
when discussing the structural determinants of effective judicial re-
view. 76  During a state of siege, one could hypothesize that judges
would tend to be much more circumspect in protecting individuals
against unconstitutional norms and official action. 77  The behavioral
indicators mentioned above could verify or disprove that hypothesis.
Table 6 may become clearer if we consider some examples.
Argentina received a relatively high effectiveness score. The president
there appoints, with the consent of the Senate, the magistrates of the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. 78 The justices hold office
for life during their good behavior. 79 There is a federal judicial
system, and each province also maintains its own hierarchy of courts.
The federal judiciary has jurisdiction over all cases dealing with the na-
tional constitution and laws, as well as cases that involve citizens of dif-
ferent provinces, even if only provincial laws are relied upon." Consti-
tutional questions can be heard by the lower federal courts as well as
by the Supreme Court. While certain military matters are not appeal-
able before the Supreme Court, administrative, tax and labor cases are
appealable, thus giving the Argentine high court a broad scope of
competence."' Since a constitutional ruling does not nullify an offen-
sive statute or decree, however, the courts' power only affects the
parties in the particular case. 2
On the lower end of the judicial effectiveness scale, Ecuador
serves as an illustration. Justices of the Supreme Court are elected for
terms of six years by the Congress. 3 Lower court magistrates in this
75. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE
STATE OF SIEGE AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN Tm AMERICAS 1, 5 (1963),
K. KARST, LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTONS 690-91 (1966).
76. A state of siege (or similar measure) has recently been declared in the follow-
ing countries: Argentina (November 1974); Bolivia (November 1974); Chile (Septem-
ber 1973); Nicaragua (January 1975); and Peru (February 1975). 2-3 LATIN AMERI-
CAN INDEX (1974-75).
77. See BEcKER, supra note 3, at 165-66.
78. CONSTrrUCI6N art. 86(5) (1853, amended 1,860, 1866, 1898 and 1957).
79. Id. at art. 96.
80. Id. at art. 100.
81. WORLD PEACE THRoUGH LAw CENTER, Argentina, LAw & JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF
NATIONS 5-10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL SysTEMS].
82. PIERSON & GIL, supra note 12, at 290.
83. CONSTrrUCI6N art. 203 (1945, amended 1972).
[ Vol. 2
Spring 19751 CONSTITUTION IN LATIN AMERICA 429
unitary judicial system serve for shorter periods and are appointed by
the Supreme Court.84 Recruitment, however, is coded zero in Table
6 because the legislature has been suspended since the military coup
d'tat of Brigadier General Guillermo Rodriguez in 1972. He rein-
stated the 1945 Constitution with certain amendments.8 5  This docu-
ment envisions a tribunal for constitutional guarantees composed of ten
members, with only one from the judiciary. This body would be the
general overseer of the Constitution, presenting unconstitutional laws
to Congress for its final decision in a peculiarly Ecuadorian procedure. 6
This court has not yet been instituted. 7  Rather, the Supreme Court
continues to exercise the function of constitutional guardian.
The Supreme Court acts in two ways to protect the Constitution.
First, it can declare any law, decree or regulation contrary to the Consti-
tution for the purposes of the particular litigation before it. This dec-
laration has, consequently, only inter partes effect.88  Second, the
Supreme Court has the power to suspend the application of a law, de-
cree or regulation as unconstitutional, upon its own initiative or upon
petition, until such time as Congress may make the final determination
of the legal norm's constitutionality.8 9 The judiciary's jurisdiction,
finally, is not as encompassing as that in other nations;90 collective labor
disputes can only be appealed to a conciliation and arbitration court
under the ministry of labor. 1
Chile has probably the most complicated structure of judicial re-
view in Latin America. At the center is the Supreme Court, with
judges appointed for life by the executive from a list of five individuals
nominated by the Supreme Court itself.9 2 The Supreme Court has
broad superintendence over the lower courts handling civil, penal and
administrative cases as well as over the special courts dealing with Ia-
84. Id. at art. 205(1).
85. Bustamante & Lovato, Ecuador, in 1E INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Com-
PARAnvE LAw 1-2 (V. Knapp ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Bustamante & Lovato];
TnE STATEsMAN'S YEAR-BOoK 1974-1975, 876 (J. Paxton ed. 1974).
86. CONSTrruCI6N arts. 219-20.
87. Bustamante & Lovato, supra note 85, at 2.
88. CONSTITUcI6N art. 206.
89. Id. at art. 205 (4). It is not clear what the consequences of this provision are
when the Congress is suspended. It is probable that the Supreme Court is not exercising
this power and that the executive shares the guardianship of the constitution along with
the Supreme Court's authority to make rulings inter partes. See Bustamante & Lovato,
supra note 85, at 2.
90. See Table 6, supra.
91. Bustamante & Lovato, supra note 85, at 2.
92. CONS'TrrC6N art. 83 (1925, amended 1943, 1957, 1959, 1967, 1970 and
1971).
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bor, agrarian and social law cases.9 3 Almost all declarations of uncon-
stitutionality of legislation by the Supreme Court, which are effective
only inter partes, occur as the result of appeals from cases either pend-
ing or already concluded by definitive sentences.94
A second institution exercising judicial review in Chile was created
in 1927, the contraloria general (comptroller general). Heading an
autonomous agency with both administrative and judicial functions, the
comptroller is appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate
and enjoys the same guarantees of tenure as members of the Supreme
Court. The contraloria takes cognizance of all executive decrees before
they are applied and pronounces upon their constitutionality and legal-
ity. If necessary, it returns them for reconsideration by the executive
within twenty days from the time they are received. 95 It is still possible,
nevertheless, for the decree to be issued if it is countersigned by the
president and all cabinet ministers. Although the contraloria exerts
significant control over the executive, the judiciary may be an even
greater constraint at another level since it has the authority, through
the amparo petition, to protect individual rights from the unconstitu-
tional action of public administration officials.96
Finally, a constitutional court, with jurisdiction over both legisla-
tive and executive acts, was added in 1970 to complement the Chilean
contralorids jurisdiction over executive decrees. Five magistrates
(each with a four year tenure) comprise this new constitutional court.
Three members are appointed by the president with the consent of the
Senate, and two are selected from among the members of the Supreme
Court. Upon request of the president or Congress, the Court has the
power to determine the constitutionality of a law before its promulga-
tion or a decree-law that has been rejected by the contraloria. Rulings
of this constitutional court have egra omnes effects; the Supreme Court
cannot later make a contrary decision.97
Although Chilean judicial review has an effectiveness rating of
eight based on the structural determinants in Table 6, behavioral indi-
93. F. GIL, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CHILE 125-27 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
F. Gu].
94. Id. at 125; Illanes, The Supreme Court of Justice of Chile, 7 J. INT'L COMMIS-
SION OF JURISTS 269, 274-75 (1966); Chile, INTEATIONAL ENCYCLoPEDrA OF COm-
PARATIvE Lkw 5-6 (V. Knapp ed., typed version in Spanish, Stanford Law School
SLADE program).
95. F. GIL, supra note 93, at 97-98; R. RECABARREN, LA TOmA DE RAzON DE Los
DECRETOS Y RESOLUCIONES 50-59 (1969).
96. Chile, JuDcrAL SYSTEMS, supra note 81, at 9.
97. CoNsTrruc6N art. 78(a), (b) and (c).
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cators would probably give Chile a lower rating beginning in Septem-
ber, 1973 when General Augusto Pinochet and his military junta over-
threw the previously elected regime of Salvador Allende. Congress
was immediately dissolved and a state of siege was declared. 98  This
state of siege was downgraded by the junta in 1974 to a state of do-
mestic emergency. Nevertheless, there are several situations in which
civil liberties remain suspended. Even though the contraloria was ac-
tive in rejecting several of President Allende's executive decrees, only
one decree-law of the present regime has been declared unconstitu-
tional. Similarly, although the amparo petition to protect individual
rights has not been suspended, the courts have been systematically
denying this petition since September, 1973." 9
Colombia has a very high rating for effectiveness of judicial review
in Table 6. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence to support
this rating. Colombia instituted in 1910 the "popular action" against
statutes, which permits any person, regardless of any direct interest in
the outcome, to bring an action directly to the Supreme Court challeng-
ing a statute. The Court's decision of unenforceability has the effect
of annulling the statute. During the period 1910-53, over fifty
national statutes in whole or in part were invalidated under the popular
action.100
There is also some behavioral evidence to support Costa Rica's
relatively high effectiveness score in Table 6.101 The salaries of
Supreme Court judges, for instance, compare favorably with those of
executive ministers or full time law professors. Thus, in 1945,
Supreme Court magistrates earned a monthly salary from 1200 to 1500
colones, while ministers were paid 1500 colones. (There were no full
time law professors in Costa Rica until 1958.) By 1970, Supreme
Court judges earned 4500 to 6000 colones, ministers 5000 colones and
full time law professors 3200 to 4000 colones.102 In the administrative
98. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
99. Interview with a Chilean (who wishes to remain anonymous), February 3,
1975.
100. Grant, supra note 39, at 194-95. For a thorough discussion of the Colombian
experience in judicial review, see Grant, Judicial Control of the Constitutionality of
Statutes and Administrative Legislation in Colombia, 23 So. CAL. L. Rv. 484 (1950);
Grant, Judicial Review by Executive Reference Prior to Promulgation, The Columbian
Experience, 21 So. CAL. L. REV. 154 (1948).
101. For a comment on the supreme court tenure question, see Gutirrrez, Sintesis
del Proceso Constitucional, in COsTA RICA CoNsTTUCI6N POLMCA XXV (1975).
102. Interview with Dr. Carlos Jos6 Guti6rrez, former dean of the University of
Costa Rica Law School, at Stanford, California, February 6, 1975. Dr. Guti6rrez is the
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tax court, the decisions of which are reviewable by ordinary courts,
thirty-nine percent to sixty-five percent of the cases were modified or
decided against the government annually between 1963 and 1970.103
Finally, since the ratification of the 1949 Constitution, at least five stat-
utes or decrees have been declared unconstitutional, with erga omnes
effects, by the plenary Supreme Court.1
0 4
Mexican judicial review, of all the nations in Latin America, has
been the most studied. It is possible, therefore, to assert with some
confidence that the score assigned in Table 6 reflects the relatively high
degree of effectiveness in constitutional review exercised by the Mexi-
can federal judiciary.' 015 The practice of judicial review in Mexico
today is associated exclusively with -the amparo action.1 6 The writ of
amparo lies against the actions of all types of officials, including judges,
bureaucrats, police, legislators, and even the president and his cabinet.
The writ takes three separate forms. First, the direct amparo may be
used to reverse the final judgment of a state or federal court, a labor
mediation board, or the federal tax court. A plaintiff takes his appeal
"directly" to one of the chambers of the Supreme Court, or, since 1968,
to the nearest collegiate circuit court, depending on the importance of
the case.'
A second form of the writ, an indirect amparo, is brought against
all other types of illegal or fundamentally unfair acts of government
authorities. The indirect amparo generally is utilized to enjoin or
compel specific actions of nonjudicial authorities-the police, prosecu-
tors and public administrators. Instead of proceeding directly to the
appellate courts, the plaintiff must first bring his complaint before the
nearest federal district court.'08 From here, the case may be taken "in-
author of a forthcoming book on the Costa Rican legal system, written under the aus-
pices of the SLADE program at Stanford Law School; see note 70 supra. In 1970, 1000
Costa Rican colones were equivalent to approximately U.S. $150.
103. Id.
104. Id. See generally M. Murillo, Jurisprudencia Constitucional (unpublished ex-
tracts from Supreme Court decisions available in Stanford Law School SLADE program,
1973).
105. Along with Argentina, Mexico is the only other country in Latin America
with both a national and a state (or provincial) system of trial courts. Brazil has fed-
eral appellate courts, but no federal trial courts. Moniz de Arag.o, The Brazilian Judi-
cial Organization, 6 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 237, 250-52 (1964).
106. R. BAKR, JUDICIAL REvIEw IN MEXICO 90 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
BAKER]. For a brief history of the writ of amparo, see H. CLAGETr & D. VALDERRAMA,
A REvsEn Guma TO THE LAW & LEGAL LrrERATuRE oF MExico 38-61 (1973).
107. Schwarz, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the
Mexican Writ of Amparo: Some Possible Applications to Judicial Review in the United
States, 7 CAL. WEsT. L. REV. 331, 332 (1971).
108. Id. at 332-33.
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directly" for consideration by the circuit or Supreme Court.
The third form of the writ is designed to attack the inherent con-
stitutionality of an offending statute, decree or regulation. Called an
amparo contra leyes, it permits an individual to enjoin enforcement, but
only to protect himself, of an injurious self-executing law. Initiated in
the federal district court, the amparo contra leyes may be ultimately
decided by all the chambers of the Supreme Court sitting in plenary ses-
sion. 00 As in half the countries of Latin America, the Mexican con-
stitutional ruling only has inter partes effects. There is, however, in
Mexico a form of stare decisis, called jurisprudencia, which mitigates
the inefficiency involved in having each aggrieved party take his own
amparo contra leyes to the Supreme Court. Jurisprudencia, declaring
a legal norm unconstitutional, is established by a two-thirds majority of
the whole Supreme Court in five consecutive decisions on the same
point. It is binding upon all lower courts, as well as military, labor and
administrative tribunals. In spite of this, jurisprudencia is frequently
ignored by administrative agencies. Amparo contra leyes judgments,
as a result, can never have the effect of abrogating a law erga omnes."
Two excellent empirical investigations of judicial review in Mexico
have concluded that the federal judiciary exhibits significant independ-
ence, especially from -the executive.' 1  One study sought to measure
the number of amparo cases decided in favor of the complainant in
which the president was named as at least one of the responsible
authorities. During the period 1917 to 1960, 3700 such cases were
tallied-thirty-four percent were won by the plaintiff.1 1 2 In a similar
examination of decisions before the United States Supreme Court in
which the federal government was a party, thirty-six percent of the
cases between 1900 and 1967 were decided in favor of the nongovern-
mental party.11 3  Even more impressive is the total output of the
Mexican Supreme Court. Between 1963 and 1971, the high court de-
cided 67,700 cases; almost ninety percent of these dealt with the writ
of amparo, an annual average of 6,683 amparos. 4 It is obvious that
109. Id. at 334-35. The plaintiff in an amparo contra leyes petition must name,
as responsible authority, the legislature passing the offending norm, the president or gov-
ernor signing it, and the executive agency administering it. If the statute or regulation
expressly requires a subsequent act for its enforcement, such as a hearing, it is not a
self-executing law. The hearing, in this latter case, should be attacked in an indirect
amparo. Id. at 335.
110. BAKER, supra note 106, at 256, 270.
111. GONZALEZ, supra note 3, at 23; Schwarz, supra note 3, at 314-15, 332.
112. GONZALEZ, supra note 3, at 22.
113. R. ScGLrANO, THE SuPRi COURT & THm PRESiDENCY 177 (1971).
114. Schwarz, supra note 3, at 316.
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the Mexican citizenry is well aware of judicial remedies when aggrieved
by official action. This is reflected even more in the case load of the
lower federal judiciary. In 1971, the thirteen collegiate circuit courts
disposed of 21,349 cases, most of which were amparos.115 Finally, the
fifty-five district courts received in the same year some 58,000 filings;
sixty-two percent of these were amparo petitions for relief from crimi-
nal proceedings. Fully 12.5 percent of the criminal amparo writs were
granted; the analogous figure for federal habeas corpus in the United
States is five percent.116
Effective judicial review, of course, need not be a homogeneous
phenomenon. In most nations, the judiciary will be more independent
in protecting the constitution against some political agencies than
against others. Table 7, considering only supreme court cases involv-
ing the government as a party, reflects this variability in Mexico com-
pared to the United States for four subject matter areas: penal, admin-
istrative, labor and civil law.
Table 7: Percentage of Cases Decided in Favor of Nongovernmental
Party in Mexican and United States Supreme Courts,
by Subject Matter'
Subject
Matter Mexico United States
Penal 49% (49) 74% (98)2
Administrative 40% (39)3 39% (48)
Labor 43% (34) 0% (0) 4
Civil 40% (69) 75% (18) 5
TOTAL 6  43% (191) 55% (164)
1. This table represents a survey made of amparo cases decided by full written
opinion as reported in the Semanario Judicial (Mexico) for a 33 month period during
1964-66, and 1968, compared with the United States Court's final dispositions with
full written opinion during the three terms of 1966-68. The figures in parentheses are
the number of cases the nongovernmental party won. See Schwarz, supra note 3,
at 318-19.
2. Includes federal and state criminal cases and federal habeas corpus petitions.
3. Includes indirect amparos and amparos contra leyes.
4. National Labor Relations Board cases; 14 were decided in favor of the
government.
5. Private litigation with the government as a party.
6. Excludes nine cases in Mexico remanded to other chambers of the Supreme
Court or to lower courts and 70 cases in the United States where the government was
not a party.
SOURCE: See Schwarz, Judges Under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the
United States and Mexico, 3 CAL. WEST. INT'L. J. 260, 321 (1973).
In Mexico, the percentage of cases decided in favor of the non-
governmental party at the Supreme Court level is similar for all four
subject matters, varying between forty and forty-nine percent. On the
115. Id. at 326.
116. Id. at 327-29.
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other hand, there is much more variability in the United States Supreme
Court. Penal cases, representing two-thirds of the decisions in Table
7, are decided in favor of the nongovernmental party seventy-four per-
cent of the time, reflecting a concern with this field on the part of the
United States Court. The total percentage of cases decided in favor
of nongovernmental parties, moreover, is higher in the United States
compared to Mexico, fifty-five percent to forty-three percent. Never-
theless, the Mexican Supreme Court, viewing all the indicators dis-
cussed above, appears to be effective in serving as the guardian of the
national constitution.
Economic Development, Democracy and the
Effectiveness of Judicial Review
Comparison permits us to make meaningful statements about the
effectiveness of judicial review in Latin America. This section will
attempt a preliminary ordering of our understanding of a complex sub-
ject matter, one that is difficult to measure and about which little is
empirically known.117  Once it is determined that constitutional review
is more effective in some nations than in others, even with the
imperfect indicators elaborated in Table 6, we may want to know why,
or at least under what conditions, effective review seems to occur.
After assessing the distribution of effective judicial review among Latin
American nations, we shall compare the nations in terms of their level
of economic development and their present type of political regime. In
this way, one can determine whether or not effective judicial review
in Latin America occurs randomly or under certain predictable circum-
stances.
A frequency breakdown for the scores on the effectiveness of
judicial review from Table 6 reveals that there is a fairly even spread
among levels two to nine, with the mode at level five. 18
Table 8: Degree of Effectiveness of Judicial Review in Latin America'
2 3 4 5 7 8 9
Cuba
El Salvador
Bolivia Guatemala Argentina Chile
Dominican Costa
Ecuador Republic Haiti Panama Nicaragua Rica Brazil
Paraguay Honduras Peru Uruguay Venezuela Mexico Colombia
1. Effectiveness is represented by degrees 2 to 9, with 9 the most effectivejudicial review.
SOURCE: See Table 6 supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 64-76 supra.
118. See Table 8 infra.
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Given the frequency distribution of scores in Table 8, one might
wish to ascertain how widespread effective judicial review is with
respect to population in Latin America. Recent population figures are
given in Table 9. Dividing the scores into three classes of approxi-
mately equal size-effective (7 to 9), somewhat effective (5), and
ineffective (2 to 4)-it appears that out of a total Latin American pop-
ulation of 286 million, seventy-eight percent of the people live in
countries with effective (scores 7 to 9) judicial review.119 Only four-
teen percent live in the seven nations with a judiciary ineffective
(scores 2 to 4) in protecting the constitution. Wild generalizations
about Latin America as a region with ineffectual judiciaries, based upon
occurrences in Bolivia, Haiti or the Dominican Republic, for instance,
too often lead to misunderstanding and stereotyping.1 20
Another manner of assessing judicial review is to consider its
effectiveness in relation to the economic development of a nation.
Table 9 gives us two measures of economic development: gross domes-
tic product per capita, and a more indirect indicator, male life
expectancy at birth. The most widely accepted and commonly em-
ployed index to measure -the production and resources of a country in
terms of the size of its population is gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita. GDP per capita is also frequently used as an indicator of rela-
tive comfort or well-being. 2' A second indicator, male life expectancy
at birth, has similarly been used as a measure of economic develop-
ment, although it is obviously not an index of production. It also can
119. For a similar grouping of nations with substantial judicial independence in the
early 1960's, see LAMBERT, supra note 3, at 295.
120. See id. at 272-73. See generally A. EDELMANN, LATIN AmmcAN PoLrrics AND
GOVERNMENT 462 (1965); M. NEEDLER, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS IN PERSPECTIVE
152-55 (1963); Mechem, Latin American Constitutions: Nominal a~ld Real, 21 J. POLI-
TICS (1959), THE DYNAMIcs OF CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS 42 (Martz
ed. 1965). A more serious indictment has been made about the protection of human
rights in Brazil since 1964. It is claimed, for example, that at least 40 people have been
beaten to death by the police or prison officials and probably mote than 21,000 have
been detained at some time for political reasons from 1964 to 1973. Tyson, Economic
Growth and Human Rights in Brazil: The First Nine Years of Military Tutelage, 67
AM. J. INT'L L. 208-10 (1973). No one, of course, would want to defend this record.
It would be very instructive, nevertheless, to compare these figures, as well as the be-
havioral indicators presented in Tables 3 and 4, with Brazilian indicators from a prior
period or with indicators from other nations.
121. C. TAYLOR & M. HUDSON, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POITICJL AND SOCIAL INDI-
CATO S 287-88 (2d ed. 1972); Finsterbusch, Recent Rank Ordering of Nations in Terms
of Level and Rate of Development, 8 STUDIES COMP. INT'L DEVELoPmENT 53 (1973).
GDP per capita is an imperfect measure of economic well-being because the distribution
of income varies from one nation to another.
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be considered a rough measure of socioeconomic well-being.' 22
Table 9: Population and Indicators of Economic Development in






























































































1. Calculation is for 1968.
2. Calculation is for 1969.
SOURCES: Population-STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LATIN AMERICA 1972, at 49
(1974); except Chile is from ORGANIZACiON DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS, AMERICA EN
CrFRAS 1974, at 15 (1974). GDP Per Capita-STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LATIN
AMERICA 1972, at 433 (1974); except Cuba is from JUNTA CENTRAL DE PLANIICACION
(Cuba), BOLETIN ESTADISTICO 1971, at 45 (1971) [for 1968 GDP estimated at
7,330,000,000 pesos], and STATISTICAL HANDBOOK ON CUBA 10, 78 (A. Bekarevich ed.,
trans. from Russian 1973) [for 1968 population estimated at 8,074,000 and exchange
rate at 1 peso = $0.91]. Male Life Expectancy-STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LATIN
AMERICA 1972, at 5 (1974).
Is effectiveness of judicial review associated with economic pro-
duction per person in a Latin American country or with the average
122. M. NEEDLER, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 86 (1968).
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citizen's socioeconomic well-being? Figure 1 gives us a preliminary
answer. It is a scattergun plotting the effectiveness score on the hori-
zontal axis and GDP per capita on the vertical axis for all twenty Latin
American nations.






















1 2 3 4 5
Degree of Effectiveness of Judicial Review
SOURCES: See Table 6 and Table 9, supra.
6 7 8 9
There appears to be a positive association between the level of
economic development and the degree of judicial effectiveness. Those
nations where the court system is ineffective in protecting the constitu-
tion (scores 2 to 4) have a per capita GDP of $400 or below. Con-
versely, those Latin American countries with relatively effective judicial
review (scores 7 to 9) all have per capita GDPs greater ,than $400.
The strength of this apparent association between the level of economic
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development and judicial effectiveness can be determined by calculat-
ing the correlation coefficient for these two variables. 2 ' The Pearson
coefficient of correlation is 0.47, which is statistically significant at the
0.017 level. Accordingly, there is a moderate, positive correlation; as
a Latin American nation's production per capita increases (and pre-
sumably the average level of socioeconomic well-being follows), we can
expect'the effectiveness of judicial review to also be greater.' 24  The
0.017 significance level means that the probability of finding this
degree of correlation among these twenty countries if the variables
were not associated is less than one in fifty.
In this same manner, the Pearson correlation coefficient measur-
ing the strength of association between male life expectancy at birth
and the effectiveness of judicial review is 0.40, significant at the 0.041
level. This tends also to support the hypothesis that as Latin Ameri-
can nations become more developed economically, the judiciary can be
expected to take on added importance as a more effective guardian of
the constitution. 125
Another avenue that may give us insight into the nature of judicial
review is to consider its effectiveness in relation to the present type of
political regime in each of the Latin American countries.126  Table 10
groups the twenty nations into four types of political regimes, based
largely upon the manner in which the present chief executive was
chosen or came to office. 12 Democratic regimes are defined as those
123. See generally H. ALxnER, MATHEMATICS AND POLITICS 54-88 (1965); G. SNED--
COR & W. CocHulAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 172-90 (6th ed. 1967).
124. The use of cross-sectional data to gain insight into dynamic processes poses
several problems. When complete time series data are unavailable, however, an ex-
ploratory and preliminary use of cross-national information to draw conclusions about
a historical process is permissible. I ADELMAN & C. MoRnis, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
SocrAL EQurry rN DEVELoPING CouNTRuEs 145 (1973). See Kuh, The Validity of
Cross-Sectionally Estimated Behavior Equations in Time Series Applications, 27 ECON-
oMETICA, 197-214 (1959).
125. But cf. Trubek, When is an Omelet? What is an Egg? Some Thoughts on
Economic Development and Human Rights in Latin America, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 198-
204 (1973).
126. Several elaborate taxonomies of political regimes exist. See, e.g., G. ALMOND
& G. POWELL, CoMP AATIVE PoLITcs 255-98 (1966); G. ALMoND, POLTICAL DEVELOP-
MENT 173-79 (1970); M. CuRTIs, COMPTA ATrVE GoVERNMMENT AND POLITICS 42-63
(1968) [hereinafter cited as CuRTIs]. For an excellent historical treatment of different
types of political regimes in Spain and the breadth of judicial competence to hear dis-
putes, see J. ToHWuA, MODERNImzACION, AuToirTARIsMo Y ADMINISTRACI6N DE JUSTICIA
EN ESPARA 39-46 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TonArlA].
127. See Lanning, A Typology of Latin American Political Systems, 6 CoMI'. POL.
367, 372-75 (1974), for a division of Latin American nations similar to that used in
Table 10, even though based on the "pattern of central governmental authority office
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where there are regular constitutional opportunities for peaceful com-
petition for political power and the president is chosen in a relatively
fair election.128
Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, are characterized by
limited political pluralism;"'0 for purposes of Table 10, they are divided
into two categories depending upon whether the present chief execu-
tive came to power (or was retained) by an election noted for its
coercion and other irregularities or by a coup d'6tat. Finally, a
totalitarian regime is differentiated from an authoritarian system by the
former's larger degree of control over behavior, and by the subordina-
tion of almost all organizations to the state.130
Table 10: Effectiveness of Judicial Review and Type of Political Regime1
Authoritarian Authoritarian Radical
Democratic Pseudo-Election Coup d'Etat Totalitarian
[7] Argentina2 (1974) [9] Brazil (1974) [4] Bolivia (1971) [5] Cuba (1959)
[9] Colombia (1974) [3] Dom. Rep. (1974) [8] Chile (1973)[8] Costa Rica (1974) [5] El Salvador (1972) [2] Ecuador (1972)[8] Mexico (1970) [5] Guatemala (1974) [4] Haiti3 (1971)
[5] Uruguay (1973) [7] Nicaragua (1974) [3] Honduras (1975)




Score: 7.33 5.17 4.29 5.00
1. The classification of political regimes is based on the manner in which the
present chief executive was chosen (or retained) or came to power. The effectiveness
score for judicial review is included within brackets for each country. The year each
chief executive came to office (or was reelected) is given in parentheses.
2. Maria Estela Per6n, as former vice-president, succeeded her husband upon
his death.
3. Jean Claude Duvalier was chosen by his father, who was president for life
under the 1964 Constitution, to succeed him when be died.
SOURCES: See THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BooK 1974-1975 (J. Paxton ed. 1974);
2 LATIN AMERuCAN INDEX (1974); and interview with Dr. Carlos Jos6 Gutidrrez, at
Stanford, California, February 7, 1975 (especially in reference to the placement of
doubtful cases between either "democratic" or "authoritarian pseudo-election").
From the calculation of the mean score for the effectiveness of
judicial review for each type of political regime in Table 10, it is clear
tenure" for the period 1960-72. Lanning's "power balance" category, analogous to
"democracy" in Table 10, is defined as "a pattern of regular rotation in office by central
governmental authorities." Utilization of Lanning's typology (based on the 12 year pe-
riod) would not affect the analysis presented here since it would only entail moving
Chile into the "democratic?' category and Argentina into one of the "authoritarian" cate-
gories. See Table 10 infra.
128. See S. LnsET, POLITICAL MAN 46 (1960); J. SCHtJMPETER, CAPITALISM, SO-
CIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (3d ed. 1950); Linz, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,
CLEAVAGFs, IDEOLOGmS AND PAITY SYSTEMS 295 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Linz].
129. See Linz, supra note 128, at 297.
130. See CuRaTis, supra note 126, at 59.
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that democratic nations ii Latin America tend to have more effective
judicial protection of the constitution than authoritarian systems.
Eleven of the fourteen countries classified authoritarian or totalitarian
received low scores, with Brazil, Chile and Nicaragua the only excep-
tion. This result is what one might expect. Democracy, as a system
based upon extensive political pluralism, requires a relatively strong
judiciary to protect the individual against unconstitutional government
activity. Consequently, the two tend to occur together. From Figure
1 one might infer, moreover, that this relationship is usually found at
higher levels of economic development. 13' Authoritarian regimes, on
the other hand, probably due to their lower level of economic develop-
ment, cannot control political diversity. When the enormous pressures
due to social mobilization are placed on a government already frag-
mented by various political forces, the polity degenerates into a condi-
tion of disorder and stagnation. 13 Authoritarian regimes, by limiting
the participation of political groups, can in some instances be more ef-
ficient in achieving desired national goals. Modernizing authoritarian
governments frequently select economic growth as the primary goal, as
in Brazil, or some notion of social justice, as in the case of Peru. On
the other hand, conservative authoritarian regimes in Latin America,
such as Paraguay or Haiti, may be characterized more as personal dic-
tatorships, less interested in productively channeling the forces of
modernization.
Restricting the effectiveness of the judiciary in protecting constitu-
tional guarantees is one way authoritarian and totalitarian systems limit
political pluralism. This need not, however, always be directed toward
controlling the judiciary through recruitment and short tenure. Fre-
quently, the political branches of government will simply reduce the
jurisdiction of the supreme court so that it can review only certain types
of disputes.-3 3 Thus, all of the democracies in Latin America provide
their supreme courts with wide competence over disputes in society.
On the contrary, from Table 6 one observes that eight of the thirteen
authoritarian nations restrict the jurisdiction of their supreme courts in
one or two important subject matter areas. Cuba, moreover, receives
131. See generally S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SocETms 39-
47 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HUNTINGTON]; M. NEEDLER, supra note 123, at 91. See
also Torres, Concentration of Political Power and Levels of Economic Development in
Latin American Countries, 7 J. DEvELOPING AREAs 397-410 (1973).
132. HuNTiNGTON, supra note 131, at 47-56; Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Po-
litical Development, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 493, 499-501 (1961).
133. See ToHARA, supra note 126, at 39-46; Toharia, supra note 69, at 445-48.
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the lowest score for breadth of jurisdiction since three important fields
have been removed from supreme court review.134  It is a perfect ex-
ample of an independent judiciary with no power.
Conclusion
Judicial protection of the constitution has had a long and varied
history in Latin America. During the early nineteenth century, the
leading jurists of -the newly independent nations gradually evolved a
judicial procedure for reviewing the constitutionality of legislative and
executive action. Based on preliminary information, it appears that a
majority of the population in Latin America today lives under
legal systems that permit relatively effective judicial review. Recurrent
states of siege and coups d' 6tat, of course, complicate this picture.
These political phenomena, however, more frequently occur in the less
economically developed countries, which are also those usually under
authoritarian regimes. Effective judicial review, accordingly, appears
to be associated with the level of economic development. The hope
is that one day in Latin America all nations will be able to sustain suf-
ficient political diversity so that the liberties of all peoples can be pro-
tected from unconstitutional action.
134. See Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUML L. RFv. 1317, 1321-
22, 1332-34, 1345 (1969).
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